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Judicial opinions rarely identify the sequence in which the court has
addressed the different issues that were presented during the litigation.
This is partly because the sequence in which the issues are addressed in a
case is not generally regarded as a factor that can significantly influence its
outcome. Persons seeking to understand the scope and significance of
particular opinions consequently rarely attempt to ascertain this sequence,
given that the task of obtaining litigation briefs and interviewing the
parties involved in order to make this determination is difficult at best, and
is often impossible, particularly for older cases.
It is my conjecture, however, that at least with regard to some issues
that are presented in breach of contract litigation, the sequence in which
they are addressed can be significant and may even at times be outcome-
determinative. The importance under some circumstances of issue
sequencing in contract litigation needs to be more widely recognized.
Persons seeking to fully understand the opinions that address these issues
should perhaps attempt to obtain litigation briefs and interview the key
players that were involved, when such efforts are feasible. Unfortunately
the claim that I am making as to the potential significance of the sequence
in which issues are addressed for the outcomes of some cases would be
extraordinarily difficult to test empirically.
As a particularly salient example of the potential importance of issue
sequencing, consider the Statute of Frauds enforceability defense. The
various Statutes of Frauds applicable to different contracts generally
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require that the party seeking enforcement provide a writing signed by the
other party that is sufficient to indicate the existence of the contract at
issue.1 One area of Statute of Frauds jurisprudence where there is a major
split of judicial authority is whether a signed offer is alone sufficient to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds in those cases where the party seeking to
enforce the contract alleges that they have orally accepted that offer.2 A
legally-trained person who is not familiar with the jurisprudence in this
area would likely think that the courts would not regard a signed offer as
being sufficient to indicate that a contract was formed, because many offers
are not accepted. Such a person might conclude that to be sufficient to
satisfy the applicable Statute of Frauds a signed writing would not only
have to indicate the existence of an offer but would also have to indicate
that this offer was accepted, thus effectuating the primary purpose of the
Statute of Frauds by protecting the offeror from having to engage in a
swearing contest regarding whether there had been an oral acceptance.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, the majority of courts applying the
Statutes of Frauds have held that signed offers are sufficient, although
there are a substantial number of opinions holding otherwise. 3 As a result,
U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 (1979);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 207, 209 (1932).
- Compare Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Warnock, 114 S.W.2d 1161, 1164 (Tex. 1938) ("To form a
binding contract .. .the acceptance must be in writing."), with Tymon v. Linoki, 213 N.E.2d
661, 664 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (noting that an enforceable contract may be created by an oral
acceptance of a written offer).
For a comprehensive listing of "signed offer" Statute of Frauds cases decided by the mid-
twentieth century, see A. M. Swarthout, Annotation, Memorandum Which Will Satisfy Statute of
Frauds, as Predicable in Whole or Part Upon Writings Prior to the Oral Agreement, 1 A.L.R.2d 841,
852-53 (1948) and E. LeFevre, Annotation, Oral Acceptance of Written Offer by Party Sought to Be
Charged As Satisfying Statute of Frauds, 30 A.L.R.2d 972, 972-86 (1953). Later decisions have also
approved of finding a signed offer sufficient to form a contract. See, e.g., Kirschling v. Lake
Forest Sch. Dist., 687 F. Supp. 927, 931-32 (D. Del. 1988); Benya v. Stevens & Thompson Paper
Co., 468 A.2d 929, 932 (Vt. 1983); see also 72 AM. JUR. 2D § 211 n.1 (2001) (citing additional cases
in support of this position).
The two American Law Reports ("ALR") annotations and the American Jurisprudence
annotation cited above each take the position that the majority view of courts is that a signed
offer is sufficient to satisfy the applicable Statute of Frauds. Even so, they each cite several
cases holding that signed offers are not sufficient. But this is clearly not the situation for cases
decided under Section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which generally- although
not uniformly-hold that signed offers are not sufficient. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Is a Signed
Offer Sufficient to Satisfy the Statute of Frauds?, 80 N.D. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2004). Neither of the ALR
annotations nor the American Jurisprudence annotation cited above addresses the possibility
that issue sequencing may be relevant to the decisions reached in the cited cases.
Illustration 2 to Section 207 of the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932) depicts a
hypothetical situation which indicates that the drafters believed a published offer would be
sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds: "B publishes in a newspaper an offer to buy certain
goods, stating the terms of his proposal, and his name is printed under the advertisement. A
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the major contract law treatise writers are in some disagreement as to the
law regarding the sufficiency of signed offers.4
The conventional explanation for this split of authority is that courts
simply disagree about whether signed offers should suffice to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds. In other words, they disagree whether such a minimal
documentary requirement provides sufficient protection for parties against
false allegations of contractual agreements. 5 However, a better explanation
accepts the offer. The advertisement is a sufficient memorandum to charge B." Moreover,
Illustration 3 to Section 209 also indicates that the drafters are of the view that a signed offer
would be sufficient. Section 131 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979) goes
even further and states that the writing will be sufficient if it indicates that a contract has been
"offered by the signer to the other party." Additionally, Comment (f) to Section 131 also states
that a "signed written offer to the public may be sufficient." Finally, Illustration 2 to Section
131 presents another hypothetical illustration indicating that a published offer would be
sufficient: "A publishes in a newspaper an offer to buy certain goods, stating the terms of his
proposal, and his name is printed under the advertisement: B accepts the offer. The
advertisement is a sufficient memorandum to charge A."
Probably the best articulation of the rationale underlying the numerous cases that hold a
signed offer is sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds is given in CORBIN ON CONTRACTS:
Sometimes, however, A prepares and signs such a document and
sends it to B as an offer, without requiring that B shall accept by signing
it .... The written and signed offer of A is a sufficient memorandum of
the contract making it enforceable against A, when A is the party to be
charged in an action subsequently brought. This is the law, even though
the writing was signed before any contract came into existence, and even
though it has no probative value in proving that B ever accepted.... The
document is indeed a written expression of the "offer"; it is not a
memorial of a "contract." But it clearly authenticates the terms on which
A was willing to make a contract; and it goes so far toward eliminating
the danger of a successful fraud against A that the courts are fully
justified in holding it to be a sufficient memorandum. Of course, it is
possible for B to lie about having accepted. B may possibly have at first
rejected, and then attempted to accept after the power of acceptance was
ended. Or, B may have made a counter-offer on different terms, which
has been accepted by A. But the danger of successful fraud of this sort is
very slight. There is sufficient protection in A's own testimony and in the
fact that B has the burden of proof of an effective acceptance. At the very
worst, A will be held to the very terms of A's own proposal.
CAROLINE N. BROWN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: STATUTE OF FRAUDS § 22.8, at 739-41 (Joseph M.
Perillo ed., Lexis Law Publishing rev. ed. 1997). The cases holding that a signed offer is not
sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds evidence, however, that not all courts are persuaded
by the above rationale.
4 See BROWN, supra note 3; see also Crespi, supra note 3, at 1-2 (contrasting the positions
taken by the MURRAY, FARNSWORTH, CALAMARI & PERILLO and WHITE & SUMMERS contract
law treatises).
See BROWN, supra note 3 (articulating the view that a signed offer would provide
sufficient protection).
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for the divergence among courts may be that the Statute of Frauds issue
was presented at a different stage in the litigation in the cases finding a
signed offer to be sufficient than it was in the cases that found a signed
offer to be insufficient.
Let me explain why this might be so. The way lawyers and judges
approach the presentation of cases is of course influenced by their early
legal training. Contract law is usually taught to first-year law students in
the following general sequence. First, students study contract formation in
some detail, initially covering the classical offer, acceptance, mutual assent,
and consideration doctrines, and then the modern reliance-based
promissory estoppel doctrines. They then study the numerous
enforceability defenses, including the Statute of Frauds. Next, they
consider the issues presented by contract formation and breach, including
parole evidence and interpretation questions, followed by an examination
of those issues raised by the doctrine of conditions-related justified non-
performance defenses and the several excuse defenses. Finally, they turn to
the issues relating to contractual remedies. 6
This sequence of instruction makes great sense in that it provides a
framework that assists students internalize an efficient analytical method
for contract law questions that will help them to avoid later unnecessary
efforts. All other potential contract law issues are obviously rendered moot
if no contract has been formed, so contract-formation questions should
logically be addressed at the outset of an inquiry and are therefore the first
topics covered in the introductory course. In similar fashion, when a
contract has been formed, but is unenforceable, this moots consideration of
any performance, breach, or remedy issues. Furthermore, all possible
remedy issues are meaningless if the defendant's nonperformance of her
contractual obligations was justified or excused so that no remedy will be
awarded. Therefore, the sequence in which these issues are covered in the
first course is designed to encourage students to address them in this same
efficient fashion later in their legal practice.
One would expect that in contract litigation the issues raised by a
dispute might often be addressed in this same sequence, given the
(perhaps largely subconscious) lingering effect of the law school
instruction to which the attorneys and judges were once exposed. If so, the
judge would not have to rule on any Statute of Frauds issues unless the
I This is the sequence I use when I teach introductory contract law at Southern Methodist
University. Most other contract law professors that I know also proceed in this general
manner. However, some introductory contract law casebooks present material relating to
remedies before they address other issues and that may be the sequence that these authors
and some of their devotees follow in their courses. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL.,
CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 8 (7th ed. 2008) (providing some case materials regarding
remedies in Chapter One).
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plaintiff first succeeds in establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the alleged contract was formed. If the plaintiff is not able to satisfy
this burden of proof, then the case will be dismissed before the Statute of
Frauds issues can be addressed.
Contract-formation disputes, however, can sometimes involve a
considerable amount of evidence, and may also require difficult judicial
determinations regarding the veracity of testimony. In contrast, a Statute
of Frauds dispute can often be easily resolved simply by considering the
sufficiency of a single document. In addition, if a Statute of Frauds issue is
resolved against the party seeking enforcement, this ruling will likely be
outcome-determinative. 7 Under these circumstances, it may be in the
interest of judicial economy to first resolve any Statute of Frauds questions
before turning to the contract-formation issues, even though it is contrary
to the "logical" sequence in which these issues are taught in law school. As
a result, courts seeking to expedite matters may direct the parties to first
litigate any Statute of Frauds questions presented so that potentially more
difficult contract-formation issues can be avoided if the party asserting the
Statute of Frauds defense prevails.
Now consider a situation where a Statute of Frauds defense is raised,
and the only signed writing that the party seeking to enforce the contract
can produce is an offer signed by the other party. A court that has initially
addressed any contract-formation issues presented will already have
determined that the plaintiff has met his burden of showing that a contract
was formed before addressing the Statute of Frauds issue. Having
concluded that a contract was formed-i.e., the offer was accepted-a
court will understandably be reluctant to allow the defendant to escape
liability for breach of contract on the basis of a Statute of Frauds defense.
The purpose of the Statute of Frauds defense-to protect a party from
having to defend itself against false allegations of an oral contract-would
appear to be inapplicable where the plaintiff has already established that a
contract was formed. For the case to then be dismissed on Statute of Frauds
grounds would honor legal technicalities over substantive justice. Under
such circumstances, a court might be inclined to regard a signed offer alone
as sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, so as to allow the case to
proceed, even though a signed offer alone necessarily leaves in question
whether that offer was ever accepted. 9
A party whose breach-of-contract claim is defeated on Statute of Frauds grounds may,
however, still occasionally be able to obtain a remedy based on a quasi-contractual claim for
restitution of benefits conferred, so as to prevent unjust enrichment. See, e.g., Monarco v. Lo
Greco, 220 P.2d 737, 739 (Cal. 1950) (en banc).
-1 A promissory-estoppel-based contract may also be formed if an offer was foreseeably
relied upon. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
See 4 CAROLINE N. BROWN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 22.8 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., Lexis
Law Publ'g 1997).
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On the other hand, a court that addresses any Statute of Frauds issues
raised at the outset of the litigation will probably have more of an open
mind on this enforceability issue because it has not yet determined whether
there is sufficient evidence to establish that a contract was formed. 10 Under
such circumstances a court may be somewhat more inclined to interpret
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds more stringently in order to
adequately protect the defendant against false allegations of contract
formation. Consequently, the court may be more inclined to conclude that
a signed offer, absent evidence that it was later accepted, is alone
insufficient.
If one were to take a large sample of "signed offer" Statute of Frauds
cases that also raised contract-formation issues and then perform the
detailed research necessary to determine the sequence in which the
contract-formation issues and Statute of Frauds issues were addressed, he
or she would probably find that there is a greater chance, perhaps
significantly so, that a court will find a signed offer sufficient to satisfy the
applicable Statute of Frauds if the court has first addressed and resolved in
favor of the plaintiff the contract-formation issues prior to turning to the
Statute of Frauds inquiry. If so, such a finding would present a significant
strategic consideration relevant for the parties to the litigation. The party
seeking to enforce the contract on the basis of a signed offer should attempt
to have the court first address the contract-formation issues before turning
b" See Fox Dev., Inc. v. England, 837 N.E.2d 161, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ("The statute of
frauds does not govern the formation of a contract but only the enforceability of contracts that
have been formed.").
I believe that my conjecture here as to the importance of issue sequencing in the "signed
offer" Statute of Frauds context is facially plausible. However, given the lack of explicit
judicial recognition of the importance of this factor, it would be a good idea to subject this
conjecture to an empirical test to see if it can be confirmed (or disconfirmed). I gave some
serious thought to carrying out such an undertaking as part of the preparation of this Article,
but I ultimately determined that an empirical investigation that might prove to be sufficient to
resolve the question simply would not be feasible. Such an inquiry would involve a great deal
of work, perhaps more effort than this interesting but relatively narrow issue merits. As I have
noted, the judicial opinions rarely reveal the sequence in which the legal issues were
addressed, so litigation briefs would have to be obtained and lawyer and/or judicial
interviews taken for a large number of cases in many different jurisdictions in order to have
an adequate sample of cases for which the litigation sequence of contract-formation issues and
Statute of Frauds issues is known from which to draw statistically meaningful conclusions.
Moreover, many of the "signed offer" Statute of Frauds cases in the reporters were decided
many years ago and litigation briefs and detailed trial records or clear attorney or judicial
recollections of the sequence in which the issues were addressed may simply no longer exist
for a number of these cases. I will therefore limit this Article to simply presenting my
conjecture with regard to the significance of the order in which these issues are addressed for
the "signed offer" Statute of Frauds cases and leave it to others with more imagination or
ambition to determine whether my speculations are well-grounded.
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to the Statute of Frauds issue, so as to attempt to undercut any judicial
inclination to apply the Statute of Frauds requirements stringently. By
contrast, the party seeking to block enforcement of the contract should
instead press to have the Statute of Frauds issue addressed at the outset of
the case before any contract-formation arguments have been advanced and
resolved adversely to that party.
Let me conclude this brief Article by making a larger point. It is
important to recognize that the "signed offer" Statute of Frauds context
that I have discussed is only one area of contract litigation where the
sequencing of issues may be significant for the case outcomes. It may also
matter in some other contexts as well. It does not appear that the other
commonly raised enforceability defenses -such as lack of capacity, fraud,
duress, illegality, or bankruptcy- would be significantly influenced by
whether those defenses are addressed before or after the contract-
formation issues, because those defenses relate primarily to the bargaining
process or other concerns that are not as directly related to contract
formation as is the Statute of Frauds. However, as is strongly suggested by
the well-known California opinion of Monarco v. Lo Greco,12 the sequence in
which contract-formation issues and quasi-contractual issues are addressed
in a dispute, which raises both kinds of questions, may be significant for
the outcome.
As Monarco indicates, a court may be less sympathetic to a party
raising an enforceability defense if it has first determined that a quasi-
contractual recovery of the value of the benefits conferred, an alternative
remedy sometimes allowed when no remedy is available under contract
law, will provide the plaintiff with an inadequate recovery under the
circumstances. 13 In other words, whether a court allows a defendant to
prevail with an enforceability defense may be influenced by whether the
court has already "peeked ahead" to consider the possibility of awarding a
quasi-contractual remedy to the plaintiff, and the adequacy of such a
remedy. If so, this again presents a similar strategic consideration for
litigants as to their optimal issue presentation sequence with regard to the
Statute of Frauds defense, or for that matter with regard to any
enforceability defense. The plaintiff seeking to overcome an enforceability
defense should first seek to demonstrate the inadequacy of any quasi-
contractual recovery to which he may be entitled, if the enforceability
- 220 P.2d 737, 737 (Cal. 1950) (permitting estoppel of a Statute of Frauds defense so as to
enforce an oral real-estate contract).
* "Those cases, however, that have refused to find an estoppel [of the Statute of Frauds]
have been cases where the court found . . . that the remedy of quantum meruit for services
rendered was adequate .... It is settled that neither the remedy of an action at law... nor the
quasi-contractual remedy for the value of services rendered is adequate for breach of a
contract to leave property by will in exchange for services .... " Id. at 740-41.
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defense is allowed. In sharp contrast, the defendant should argue that the
enforceability issue be resolved first, prior to consideration of any possible
alternative quasi-contractual claims (i.e., the usual sequence in which these
issues are presented in law school instruction).
Once again, however, any speculation regarding the significance of
issue sequencing here will be difficult or impossible to empirically confirm
or disconfirm given the difficulty of determining the precise issue
sequencing followed in each case. Nevertheless, the Monarco case
demonstrates that at least one prominent judge was willing to consider the
adequacy of a quasi-contractual award before deciding a Statute of Frauds
issue and was thereby influenced to resolve the enforceability issue in the
favor of the party seeking to enforce the contract so that this person would
not be limited to quasi-contractual relief.14
